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Opposition in authoritarian regimes 
– a case study of Russian non-systemic opposition1
Abstract: According to Juan Linz, authoritarian rulers permit limited, powerless po-
litical pluralism and organization of elections, but they make it very clear that a change 
in power is impossible and the opposition cannot take over. Elections in authoritarian 
regimes are a part of nominally democratic institutions and help rulers to legitimize 
the regime. They are not free or fair, and therefore do not present any opportunity for 
the opposition to win and change the political system afterward.
 The question could be asked, what kind of action the opposition should undertake 
in order to improve its strength. That is the main problem nowadays for non-systemic 
opposition in the Russian Federation. On the one hand, the opposition has a problem 
gaining access to elections, but on the other hand, it knows that even if it could take 
part, the elections would not be democratic.
 This article tries to shed light on the strategies of the non-systemic Russian opposi-
tion and the possibility of its impact on Russian society when the government tries to 
marginalize, weaken and eventually destroy the non-systemic opposition.
 The paper provides a critical analysis of the literature and documents on the topic.
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With reference to its title, the text aims to examine non-systemic opposition in Russia. Therefore it is necessary to explain in detail 
what kind of opposition we are speaking about and what type of authori-
tarian regime Russia can be counted among.
Non-systemic opposition – a question of terminology
In the Russian context, there are three terms used to describe groups 
criticizing Vladimir Putin’s political system. These are as follows: non-
1 The article was written as part of the NCN (National Science Centre Poland) 
project: “Non-system opposition in Russia – its role and significance in Russian inter-
nal politics” (2014/13/D/HS5/00637).
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systemic, anti-systemic and extra-systemic opposition. The controversies 
linked to the usage of these terms with respect to democratic opposition in 
Russia were mentioned by Ivan Bolshakov in his article (Bolshakov, 2012, 
pp. 82–92). I rejected the generally accepted definition of non-systemic 
opposition, which refers to those groups which are denied registration 
or function outside parliament. This different definition of non-systemic 
opposition stems from the fact that its structure is heterogeneous and it 
cannot be satisfactorily described by a simple classification for licensed 
and unlicensed parties. For example, the non-system opposition surely is 
represented by Gienadij Gudkow, who until 2013 was a member of the 
“Just Russia” party, which is a part of the State Duma. Hereafter, I will 
use the word non-systemic opposition with respect to those parties whose 
leaders and members declare they are striving to change the system cre-
ated by Vladimir Putin.
The Putin System
In connection with the foregoing, it is necessary to determine what 
governance type the ‘Putin system’ is, and what actions of the non-sys-
temic opposition are possible.
Many Russian2 – and also Western3 – political scientists have been 
trying to accurately define the regime in Russia since the time Vladimir 
Putin came to power. Without doubt, it is easy to get confused by the 
terminology used to describe Russian political system. It is worth empha-
sizing that the undemocratic character of the political regime in Russia is 
the common basis of all terminology. It was in 2005 when, for the first 
time, Freedom House described Russia as an “unfree” country. However, 
since then, the system has evolved in terms of the lack of freedom on 
many levels.
2 Aleksander Łukin, Aleksiej Zudin, Kirił Chołodkowski, Jelena Szestopał – the-
se authors’ concept is presented in the further part of this text.
3 W. Zimmerman,	Ruling	Russia:	Authoritarianism	from	the	Revolution	to	Putin, 
Princeton 2014; S. A. Greene,	Moscow	in	Movement.	Power	and	Opposition	in	Putin’s	
Russia, Stanford 2014; J. Hartmann, Russland:	Einführung	in	das	politische	System	und	
Vergleich	mit	den	postsowjetischen	Staaten, Häftad 2012; C. Ross, V. Gelman (eds.), 
The	 Politics	 of	 Subnational	 Authoritarianism	 in	 Russia, Farnham–Burlington 2010; 
R. Sakwa,	The	Crisis	of	Russian	Democracy:	The	Dual	State,	Factionalism	and	 the	
he	Medvedev	Succession, Cambridge 2011; G. B. Robertson,	The	Politics	of	Protest	in	
Hybrid	Regimes:	Managing	Dissent	in	Post-Communist	Russia, Cambridge 2010.
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Experts denote that the system built during Vladimir Putin’s reign can 
be named a hybrid regime.4 Marc Plattner, a joint editor of “Journal of 
Democracy” and a vice-chairman of “The National Endowment for De-
mocracy” (NED) notes that the term of hybrid regime is a vast one (Im-
russia, 2015). It comprises notions such as “competitive authoritarianism” 
(terminology used by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way), the “non com-
petitive authoritarianism” of Andreas Schedler, and “hegemonic electoral 
authoritarianism” of Larry Diamond.5
It is worth noting that electoral authoritarian regimes, as opposed to 
closed authoritarian systems, allow multiparty electoral competition (Di-
amond, 2002, p. 25) and can be subdivided into hegemonic authoritarian 
and competitive authoritarian regimes. It is the level of competition that 
is the essential distinguishing element between the two aforementioned 
subtypes. Both regimes hold elections but in hegemonic authoritarian re-
gimes their outcome is known in advance, while in competitive authori-
tarian regimes the elections are truly contested and the opposition candi-
dates have real chances to win (Guliyev, 2012).
Another criterion of difference is applied by Levitsky and Way, who 
point out that closed authoritarian regimes receive only –7 (the worst 
score) on the Freedom House political rights index or a –8 or worse on 
the “Polity Score” which ranges from +10 (full democracy) to –10 (full 
autocracy) (Guliyev, 2012). To make a better distinction between compet-
itive authoritarian and hegemonic authoritarian regimes, we might agree 
that the latter describes countries where the winning party or candidate 
receives 70% of the votes or more.
In 2015, during an interview given to Denis Volkov from the indepen-
dent “Levada-Center organization,” Marc Plattner described the Russian 
regime as a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime (Imrussia, 2015).
4 Ibid.
5 Numerous authors have addressed the subject of hybrid regimes: Schedler (ed.) 
(2006), Electoral	Authoritarianism:	The	Dynamics	of	Unfree	Competition, Lynne Ri-
enner, Boulder, Colo.; Diamond (2002), Thinking	about	Hybrid	Regimes, “Journal of 
Democracy” 13, no. 2 (April): 21–35; Levitsky, Way (2007), Competitive	Authori-
tarianism:	The	Origins	and	Evolution	of	Hybrid	Regimes	in	the	Post-Cold	War	Era, 
Manuscript; Roessler, Howard (2009), Post-Cold-War	Political	Regimes:	When	Do	
Elections	Matter?, in: Democratization	by	Elections:	A	New	Mode	of	Transition?, ed. 
S. Lindberg, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore; Schedler (2009), Sources	
of	Competition	under	Electoral	Authoritarianism, in: Democratization	by	Elections:	
A	New	Mode	of	Transition?, ed. S. Lindberg, John Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more.
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To clarify this description it is necessary to make reference to the 
term of “full authoritarianism” used by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 
Regimes with no competition are those that can be counted among “ful-
ly authoritarian” regimes. In this category, the authors list both closed 
authoritarian regimes, such as China, Saudi Arabia and Cuba, and also 
hegemonic regimes where the democratic institutions function formally, 
but in practice play only a decorative role (Imrussia, 2015). In the latter 
category, opposition is marginalized or repressed and has no chances of 
winning elections (Levitsky, Way, 2010). Nevertheless, there are sev-
eral degrees of repression that can be identified in hegemonic regimes. 
Although Russia is not among the most repressive regimes, no power 
shift through elections in this country is presently possible. According 
to Shevtsova, since 1999, the opponents in presidential elections have 
not been actual candidates but “Kremlin sparring partners” (Shevtsova, 
2012, p. 20).
In Plattner’s opinion, electoral manipulations, the extension of the 
presidential mandate and the successful process of succession are per-
mitted in order to maintain the stability of the regime built during Vladi-
mir Putin’s time. Russian experts also emphasize the authoritarian nature 
of the Russian system. Aleksey Zudin and Kiril Kholodkovski speak of 
a monocentric system, which manifests itself in the existence of a single 
decision-making centre (Słowikowski, 2010, p. 42) The common denom-
inator in the views of many Russian political scientists and experts on the 
political regime in Russia is the conviction that power is of a personified 
nature, that the administration is organized vertically, that it is impossible 
to change the Russian authorities through elections and that control on the 
part of the political elite is increasing.6
It is true that this is a system in which technically elections do exist, but 
it is not possible to change governments by way of elections. The political 
scientist Andreas Schedler says that “[b]y organizing periodic elections 
[authoritarian regimes] try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic 
legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the 
same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls 
they try to cement their continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap 
the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic 
uncertainty” (Schedler, 2002, p. 37).
6 Władimir Gelman, Jelena Szestopał, Kirił Chołodkowskij, Aleksiej Zudin, Ale-
ksander Łukin.
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Andreas Schedler also mentions the mechanisms that help the elec-
toral authoritarianism to keep the status quo. These are:
1. Creating reserved positions for key decision-makers to eliminate po-
tential threats, while letting voters fill official positions that are not 
within crucial policy areas.
1. Splitting or marginalizing inexperienced opposition parties through 
killing, banning, or disqualifying candidates or excluding them via 
electoral laws (e.g. “nationality clauses”).
2. Preventing opposition from disseminating campaign messages via 
media, public space, etc. and repressing their civil and political liber-
ties, often through violent means.
3. Controlling composition of the electorate through informal disenfran-
chisement (such as registration methods, identification requirements, 
and discriminatory voting procedures.)
4. Intimidating voters from exercising free choice or attempting to buy 
the vote of the poor.
5. Introducing electoral fraud or institutional bias into elections through 
“redistributive” vote counting or rules of representation in order to 
hold on to power even when losing votes.
6. Removing elected officials from power or holding them subordinate to 
the rulers’ “tutelary” powers.
Action strategies of the opposition
The strategy of non-systemic opposition activity in Russia depends 
to a large extent on opportunities that are given by the system and on 
finding the vulnerabilities that could threaten its status quo. Taking into 
consideration, that “authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear, 
or economic prosperity”(Przevorsky, 1991, p. 58), the opposition should 
focus on accelerating the process of the system’s loss of balance.
Juan Linz’s typology introduces an interesting distinction showing the 
action strategies of the opposition against the ruling class. The author seg-
regates the opposition into loyal, semi-loyal and disloyal categories. The 
semi-loyal, as opposed to the disloyal, accepts the legal means of political 
battle and rejects political force, while the disloyal one also applies politi-
cal violence (Linz, 1978, pp. 27–38). The political scientist Adam Przev-
orsky notes: “the classical problem of any opposition ... [is] how much 
to oppose and by what means. If the opposition does notoppose – does 
180	 Olga	Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk	 ŚSP 4 ’17
not present alternatives and struggle energetically for them – then the 
representative powers of political institutions – theircapacitytomobiliz-
eandincorporate – is weak... But if the opposition does oppose vigorously, 
democracy may be threatened” (Przevorsky, 1991, p. 98).
Opposition candidates and parties sometimes protest and boycott the 
elections in hegemonic regimes if they notice that the competition is not 
fair, and in order to reject the electoral victory of the incumbent or ruling 
party.
The opposition may then create a multiparty coalition, support a cho-
sen presidential candidate from the opposition and also start anti-govern-
ment protests to disturb the elections (Howard, Roessler, 2006, p. 370). 
“Once the decision to contest elections has been made, opposition parties 
must decide whether to form pre-electoral pacts in an effort to defeat the 
incumbent. At each of these moments, opposition parties face coordina-
tion dilemmas. Electoral boycotts delegitimize the regime only if most 
(if not all) opposition parties agree to stay away from the contest. Pre-
electoral coalitions increase the likelihood of incumbent defeat only if 
most opposition candidates agree to coordinate so as to not divide the 
opposition vote” (Howard, Roessler, 2006, p. 370).
The approach of Russian non-systemic opposition groups or actors 
to the process of elections is not explicit. In 2011, before the elections to 
the State Duma, the PARNAS party had recommended taking part in the 
elections, but to spoil the voting cards; whereas a part of the “Solidar-
ity” movement’s members encouraged boycotting the elections; Alexei 
Navalny advised to vote on anyone apart from “United Russia” mem-
bers, convincing people that the ruling party is the party of “cheaters and 
thieves” (Кондратьев, 2012, p. 19).
In 2014, before the regional elections, Navalny said that there are no 
simple strategies on participating in the elections that could be expressed 
in one phrase. He recommended boycotting elections where no honest 
candidates are allowed and where the probability of falsification is high, 
but participating in the elections in districts where one can find a reason-
able candidate (Навальный, 2014).
The way of acting in the face of a crisis is listed among the most 
important typologies of Albert O. Hirschman. He assumes that “exit,” 
“voice,” and “loyalty” can be used as strategies of the opposition. They 
are described as follows: “exit” – that is to say “doing small things” (op-
positional activities without serious challenges against the existing politi-
cal reality, or a complete withdrawal from politics); “voice” – that is to 
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say the mobilization of the masses (mainly of the electoral mass); “loy-
alty” – that is to say negotiations with the ruling group and cooptation as 
a consequence of coming to power (Hirschman, 1970).
However, none of these strategies guarantee success. “Exit” by the 
opposition indicates its consent to being marginalized, “voice” and at-
tempts to mobilize the electorate can result in repressions by the ruling 
group and the “loyalty” strategy is unacceptable in the case of non-
systemic opposition. Clear success, and simultaneously the chance to 
achieve opposition objectives, could only come from winning the presi-
dential elections.
Opposition after the protest movement of 2011–2012
According to Vladimir Gelman, the situation of the Russian non-
systemic opposition parties changed in the last 10 years (Gelman, 2015, 
p. 177). In 2005, the author wrote an article about the opposition in terms 
of a “disappearing species” in Russia (Gelman, 2005, pp. 226–246). The 
opposition was then sidelined to a narrow niche and stayed there just 
like in a ghetto (Greene, 2007) it was even unable to gather more than 
100 participants in order to join anti-regime protests. The situation of the 
non-systemic opposition changed with the protests of 2011–2012 which 
managed to gather more than 100,000 participants. The opposition lead-
ers then became recognized by a part of society and the Kremlin was 
forced to change its tactics against the non-systemic opposition. It moved 
from ignoring the phenomenon to applying intimidating and marginal-
izing tactics.
The effect of economic growth that made the middle class aspire 
to greater political rights was one of the most important factors in the 
change.
Another important factor in the evolution of the non-systemic opposi-
tion in Russia was generational change. It was reflected in the changed 
formulation of fundamental national issues by politicians from the So-
viet generation and those who had grown up during post-Soviet times. 
That “conflict” not only made the politicians from the older age group 
adopt a different approach to sociopolitical reality, but also influenced the 
whole political context and the collective experiences of those groups. 
For those who grew up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all refer-
ences to the USSR and 1990s belonged more or less to the past, and they 
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were focused on building consensus in the battle against the authoritarian 
regime. At the same time, members of the 1970s generation who domi-
nated the political scene in Russia in 2000, both in the ruling camp and in 
the opposition camp, were focused on the past, resentments and revenge 
for past injustices (Gelman, 2015, p. 179). Those who entered the politi-
cal scene in 2010 looked mainly to the future.
Although leadership change became blocked in the ruling camp, the 
younger generation of activists in oppositional circles gave hope for this 
circle’s recovery. Hence, in 2013 the PARNAS party supported Alexei 
Navalny’s candidature for mayor of Moscow.
Another key factor contributing to the rebirth of the opposition in 
2010 was the “modernization” promoted by Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. 
Though that “modernization” was chaotic, inefficient and only symbol-
ic, it was however accompanied by a liberal rhetoric, demonstration of 
the will to increase the engagement of society in recommending pivotal 
decisions in the State and a more “progressive” ruling style. The weak-
ening pressure on civil society, shy attempts at dialogue with various 
groups opened the door for social initiatives and encouraged Kremlin 
opponents to formulate requests without fear of being stigmatized as 
the “opposition.” The activity of a nascent civil society became obvious 
during a protest against a highway construction in Khimki. Some of the 
slogans then entered the political space, and activists such as Yevgeniya 
Chirikova became among the most recognized faces of the Russian op-
position (Швец, 2015).
This apparent liberalization gave rise to many independent circles, 
such as the Dozhd channel; or “Society of Blue Buckets” aimed against 
the privileged status of officials, politicians, and businessmen, who over-
used emergency blue flashers.
Lastly, a further factor that was pointed out by Vladimir Gelman was 
the strategy change made by the political opposition. Instead of focus-
ing on abstract slogans concerning the necessity to develop democracy 
and human rights in Russia, the opposition focused on the overall criti-
cism of the regime. Leaders such as Alexei Navalny, Ilya Yashin, Siergiej 
Udalcow and the now deceased Boris Nemtsov condemned the govern-
ing class for being corrupt, inefficient, unable to bring positive changes 
and also for inhibiting any progress. According to Gelman, that change 
was revealed through the large anti-corruption campaigns of Navalny, or 
cooperation attempts of many circles of Russian activists that were criti-
cizing the Putin regime.
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Three factors influenced the size of the 2011/2012 protests: genera-
tional change, the growth of political opportunities in time of Medvedev, 
and the new populist strategy of the opposition emphasizing the gap be-
tween a hostile state and civil society. These changes also created new 
challenges that, at times, outgrew the opposition. It was, above all, poorly 
prepared to tackle new strategic and organizational tasks.
In terms of organizational weakness, the non-systemic opposition 
constituted a conglomeration of loosely combined groups and of public 
figures with little experience and limited capacity for cooperation.
Strategically, it was not prepared for these new circumstances, either. 
It focused only on organizing new protests and on maximizing the num-
ber of participants. The opposition could not cope with the rapid pace of 
events and still manage other activities.
In addition, the parties of the so-called systemic opposition did not 
wish to cooperate with the non-systemic opposition out of the fear that 
any change in the regime could threaten their position on the Russian po-
litical scene. Only Ilya Ponomarev, Giennadij and Dmitry Gudkov, who 
represented the systemic party “Just Russia”, joined the protesters and 
their requests.
Other segments of the Russian elite, namely the businessmen that 
were silently supporting the activists and protesters in 2011/2012 were 
not brought into play by the opposition. As a result, that circle grew only 
to include the people who were already against Kremlin.
The opposition tried to compensate for the lack of organizational re-
sources by mobilizing society through the Internet and social media, by 
using individual connections and everyday contacts to substitute collec-
tive actions. Nevertheless, it was insufficient to use only these means in 
order to create a long-term strategy, and the opportunities to mobilize 
society by means of the Internet were quickly used up. People were easily 
mobilized in moments of emotional shock, but the opposition mistakenly 
used protest as a long-term strategy.
A project aiming to create “The	 Russian	 Opposition	 Coordination	
Council” (2012–2013), which was supposed to be an attempt to form 
a coalition, and to provide a common platform for the activities of dif-
ferent opposition parties as well as to establish a democratic coalition 
(2015–2016) also failed. Conflicts and disputes that arose during common 
projects in those groupings tarnished their image in the Russian society.
Vladimir Gelman and Galina Michaleva also drew attention to another 
weakness of compromise searching attempts among oppositional groups. 
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According to the opinion of political scientists, it blurred the objectives of 
particular political parties and their vision of State. As Vladimir Gelman 
says, “the populist strategy that forms the basis for a negative consensus 
has its limits, since it prevents the formation of a positive agenda. Unlike 
the ruling elite, the opposition does not benefit from taking deliberately 
vague and uncertain positions on heavily divisive political and policy is-
sues” (Gelman, 2014).
Thus the two principal strategies of non-systemic opposition, out of 
which the first was designed to increase the support for mass protests and, 
thanks to that, to promote the slogans of the opposition, and the second to 
create a party structure and prepare for electoral battle, failed.
Quickly enough, mass protest fatigue and elections brought no suc-
cess to the opposition. Non-systemic opposition could attract supporters 
of those principal political slogans, but could not garner support from 
a wider electorate, not even from groups that were against the regime. 
According to opinion polls (Levada, 2013) and focus group research, 
loss of support for the Kremlin did not bring more support for the op-
position (Echo.msk.ru, 2012). According to opinion in Russian society, 
the opposition mistakenly identified the most urgent expectations of the 
people and was unable to represent their interests. It only focused on 
the personal factor and slogans emphasizing the necessity of Vladimir 
Putin’s resignation.
Alfred Stepan examined the anti-authoritarian opposition in Latin 
America in terms of post-Communist Europe (Stepan, 1990, pp. 41–49). 
This analysis is still highly applicable to contemporary Russia. Stepan 
noted that the approach of opposition actors in democratizing authoritar-
ian regimes are to: (1) reject cooptation into the regime; (2) guarding 
zones of autonomy vis-à-vis the regime; (3) weaken the regime’s legiti-
macy; (4) increase the cost of preserving the status quo; and (5) build 
a trustworthy democratic alternative.
As Vladimir Gelman said, the Kremlin itself facilitated the first and 
the fourth approach by making enemies out of more citizens, as well as 
out of organized collective actors. Nevertheless, the third and especially 
the fifth tasks are more complex. These two unfulfilled tasks block the 
opposition from becoming the center of gravity for all regime protesters 
and independent social actors. The non-systemic opposition is still not 
endorsed by political and economic actors that are against the Kremlin, 
the systemic opposition and a large group of sub-elites that don’t agree 
with Kremlin priorities.
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The risk of oppression and the disbelief of ordinary Russians in the 
opposition have pushed it into isolation. According to some regime crit-
ics, preserving the political status quo may be less harmful in comparison 
to a possible collapse of the regime that may not necessarily be advanta-
geous (Gelman, 2014).
Kremlin Actions
The situation is one where the opposition carries the weight of all the 
discrediting and weakening actions taken by the Kremlin, as well as by 
regime supporters. One of the aspects of their strategy is to demonize 
the opposition in the media and to make important public officials call it 
“a	Fifth	Column”, traitors of the nation, or agents serving western coun-
tries interests and businesses, and not Russian ones.
Furthermore, there is a number of legal actions that block the opposi-
tion from freedom of action, such as tightening of legislation on non-
governmental organizations (the so-called statute on foreign agents), ex-
tremism, Internet censorship (the Internet is one of the most useful tools 
for promoting opposition opinions), public gatherings etc.
In addition, in 2016, the Kremlin decided to create a formation called 
the ‘National Guard’ to fight opponents of the regime labelled ‘internal 
enemies’. The National Guard will be used, among others, to disperse 
protest movements and will also be able to use heavy equipment for this 
purpose. Guardsmen will be permitted to shoot at people without prior 
warning, in dangerous or life threatening situations concerning other peo-
ple or officials of the new armed unit.
Alexei Makarkin notes that the creation of that formation is linked to 
the question of elections to the State Duma (taking place in September 
2016), but also to disappointing social-economic forecasts that could lead 
to a social protest (Newsru.com, 2016).
Restrictions on the possibility of competition against the ruling elite through 
universal suffrage create a limitation for the opposition. These restrictions are 
as follows: difficulty in registering an opposition party (for example, Alexei 
Navalny’s “Progress Party”), refused access to elections, high electoral thresh-
old (5%), and electoral fraud assuring the victory of groups and candidates 
supporting the present political system. The incumbent regime still uses fraud, 
repression, and other illiberal means “to create an uneven playing field be-
tween government and opposition” (Levitsky, Way, 2002, p. 55).
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Conclusion
Considering all the aforementioned circumstances, linked to the situ-
ation of the non-systemic opposition in today’s Russia, can we assume 
a possibility for the system to change through elections, or for the opposi-
tion to efficiently mobilize the society?
The situation of the opposition in the authoritarian system is the result 
of several factors which include the actions of the government, strategies 
chosen by opposition activists to deal with an oppressive regime and their 
ability to reach out to the society and attract followers. In case of the 
Russian political system, the non-systemic opposition has to cope with 
the increasingly rigorous methods of attacking it by the Kremlin in recent 
years. Moreover, it has to answer the question of what is the best strategy 
under the system built by Vladimir Putin, and how to mobilize the masses 
to fight against the regime. The analysis in this article shows that so far 
all the actions undertaken by the non-systemic opposition which aimed 
at increasing the number of its followers and becoming a real force that 
could threaten the Putin system, have failed.
As Vladimir Gelman rightly points out, the opposition will be able to 
confront authoritarianism in Russia only by consolidating and mobilizing 
a large number of regime adversaries. A ‘negative’ consolidation against 
the status quo is necessary but also incomplete, and may hinder any ac-
tion taken. The history of countries that have undergone regime change 
reveals that the opposition can achieve its goals only by cooperating with 
social groups and by being endorsed by potential allies among the elites. 
It is too soon to state if and when the new opportunities will be used by 
the opposition.
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Opozycja w reżimach autorytarnych – stadium przypadku na przykładzie 
rosyjskiej opozycji niesystemowej 
 
Streszczenie
Według Juana Linza, autorytarni władcy dopuszczają ograniczony i bezsilny plu-
ralizm polityczny i organizację wyborów, ale jasno pokazują, że zmiana władzy jest 
niemożliwa, a opozycja nie może przejąć władzy. Wybory w reżimach autorytarnych 
są częścią nominalnie demokratycznych instytucji i pomagają władzom legitymizo-
wać panujący reżim. Wybory nie są wolne ani uczciwe, a zatem nie stanowią szansy 
dla opozycji, aby wygrać i zmienić system polityczny w ich następstwie.
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Można zadać pytanie, jakiego rodzaju działania powinna podjąć opozycja w celu 
wzmocnienia swojej pozycji. Jest to obecnie główny problem niesystemowej opozy-
cji w Federacji Rosyjskiej. Z jednej strony ma ona problem z uzyskaniem dostępu do 
wyborów, ale z drugiej strony wie, że nawet gdyby mogła wziąć w nich udział, nie 
byłyby to wybory demokratyczne.
Artykuł stara się rzucić światło na strategie niesystemowej opozycji rosyjskiej 
i możliwości jej wpływu na rosyjskie społeczeństwo, w warunkach gdy rząd próbuje 
marginalizować, osłabiać i ostatecznie niszczyć niesystemową opozycję.
Artykuł przedstawia krytyczną analizę literatury i dokumentów na ten temat.
 
Słowa kluczowe: niesystemowa opozycja, autorytaryzm, Kreml, ruch protestacyjny

